Crypto Primary Market Investment: The Triangular Interplay of Human Nature, Law, and Capital
In the gray area between interests and trust, the law serves as the bottom-line defense, but institutional design is the true solution to curbing human nature.
Author: IOSG Legal, IOSG Ventures
After years of deep engagement in the crypto industry, we have invested in hundreds of projects. Our perspective on industry investment terms has evolved from initial confusion to acceptance, and now to reflection and skepticism:
When a project's structure becomes increasingly complex and its documentation more professional, are we truly enhancing security, or merely making risk appear more respectable? When agreements are filled with governance clauses, can these rights actually be enforced, or are they purely theoretical?
The systemic risks in Web3 investments often lie not in the market, but in the insufficient accountability of the architecture itself. Documents may look polished and terminology complete, but in worst-case scenarios, investors cannot identify the liable entity, cannot constrain control rights, and find no viable remediation path. Essentially, this is not risk management; it is risk packaging.
Three Recurring Structural Issues:
1. Excessive Entity Segmentation:
Value, control, and liability are artificially separated. R&D/operations are housed in one company, while token issuance and the treasury reside in another entity (foundation/SPV), and investors may only sign agreements with one of them.
On the surface, it resembles risk isolation, but in reality, it creates "orphaned risk": when things go wrong, everyone can say "that's not me." Investors have never feared decentralization; they fear de-responsibilization.
2. Governance Reduced to Symbolism:
There are documents but no mechanisms; there are rights but no teeth.
In the early days, investors relied on verbal commitments and gentleman's agreements (which now seem like pure Wild West adventure spirit), and even later instruments like SAFTE/SAFE/SAFT/SAFE+Token Warrants left critical components missing.
Substantive consent rights for major decisions, budgeting and audit schedules for treasury expenditures, rules for replacing multi-signature signers, and the scope and boundaries of information disclosure—read like corporate governance, but executed like a wish list.
3. Structural Weakening of Remediation Paths:
Assets move faster than the law, entities change faster than procedures, and cross-border costs exceed potential compensation—all of which explain why defending rights in crypto investments is so difficult. For investors, true risk management isn't about writing longer clauses; it's about ensuring that in the worst case, you can "stop the bleeding," "trace assets," and "enforce judgments."
This industry has moved past the early "dark forest" phase, yet sudden project collapses remain commonplace. There are two root causes: first, some founders lack reverence for contractual spirit; second, the industry lacks structural memory, causing investors to repeatedly make the same mistakes in architecture design.
Through five real-world case scenarios, this article examines structural issues that are usually overlooked but can prove fatal under extreme circumstances, distilling practical lessons into actionable principles.
Case 1: From "Perfect Architecture" to "The Vanishing Defendant"
Keywords: Entity Segmentation, Legal Entity Existence
Several years ago, we engaged with a project dedicated to building blockchain gaming infrastructure. The team boasted a stellar background and top-tier resumes, and their "one-click on-chain" solution directly addressed core pain points for traditional game publishers.
To raise capital and navigate complex global regulations, the project team designed a "perfect" offshore architecture widely accepted at the time: registering a parent company in Delaware, USA, responsible for tech development, while simultaneously establishing an SPV (Special Purpose Vehicle) in crypto-friendly Gibraltar specifically for token issuance.
Technology and the team in the US, tokens in an offshore SPV—this was the default consensus in investment circles at the time.
Faced with this structure, investors typically took two paths: traditional equity investors pumped money into the parent company, operating on the logic that controlling the team means controlling the project. We chose a more "Crypto Native" route: signing a Token Purchase Agreement directly with the Gibraltar SPV, exchanging investment for future token rights.
Our rationale was simple: since tokens would be the ecosystem's core asset going forward, holding direct token rights was more straightforward than equity. At the time, this seemed a highly rational judgment.
Following the investment came a relatively tranquil period. Progress was slow but steady, and the team maintained polite, restrained communication with investors.
Then one day, without notifying the US parent company or any investors, the Gibraltar SPV suddenly announced a CEO change and almost simultaneously unilaterally initiated token issuance. Internal strife went public, market confidence collapsed instantly, and the token price plummeted upon listing. The "token rights" in our hands overnight transformed from potential value into high-volatility digital chips.
Our initial reaction was anger, but upon cooling down, we quickly assessed this as more of a control struggle within the founding team. SPV management clearly attempted to break free from the parent company's control, and institutions holding parent company equity would inevitably take legal action, potentially bringing the project back on track. We chose to wait and see.
As expected. The parent company and its equity backers swiftly filed lawsuits in both the US and Gibraltar, winning early victories: they successfully obtained temporary restraining orders from a US court to restore the parent company's access to key technical infrastructure, and secured asset freezes from a Gibraltar court covering most of the SPV's issued tokens. The parent company side stood a strong chance of regaining control.
Then, an unexpected twist occurred.
The Gibraltar court overturned the freeze order. The reasoning was chillingly simple: the US parent company had been administratively dissolved by the Delaware state government over a year earlier for failing to file a mandatory compliance document continuously for more than a year.
In the eyes of the law, this company already
ceased to exist
.
A company that has legally "died" lacks the standing to sue anyone as a plaintiff. It possesses no legal personality, no capacity as a rights-bearing entity, and no interests entitled to protection by the court.
Institutions that invested in the parent company's equity were completely wiped out overnight. The legal entity behind their investments vanished, rendering all claims baseless. Investment reduced to zero.
Those of us who held SPV token rights saw our assets shrink drastically due to infighting, but at least we still held tradable tokens. Meanwhile, those formerly considered "safer" equity investors found themselves legally stripped of any footing.
Rather than relief, the dominant feeling at that moment was lingering dread.
The most lethal risk in this industry might not be market crashes, technical vulnerabilities, or even founder character flaws, but rather a forgotten compliance document costing mere hundreds of dollars.
Case Conclusion
The continuity of legal due diligence (Legal DD) is crucial.
The key to investment decisions lies not just in verifying that the corporate entity is in "Good Standing" at the moment of signing, but in establishing a continuous compliance monitoring mechanism throughout the entire investment cycle. Ensuring every legal entity in the investment chain remains "alive" and compliant is the most fundamental baseline of investment management, yet it is frequently overlooked.
Deep understanding of actual control over offshore structures is mandatory.
When core assets (such as token issuance rights) are placed in an offshore SPV, and the parent company's control over said SPV relies solely on an agreement, investors must maintain heightened vigilance. Strong covenants must be embedded in the investment agreement: e.g., no changes to SPV directors or controllers without majority investor consent;
the parent company must maintain its legal existence, or else trigger default clauses; any major decisions (like Token Launches) require approval from director(s) appointed by investors. These clauses must be explicitly written in from the outset, not added reactively after problems arise.
Do not blindly trust lead investors.
Even top-tier industry funds may have blind spots or undisclosed conflicts of interest in their due diligence. Independent, cross-validated reference checks are indispensable. Investors must rely on their own independent judgment and take responsibility for their capital.
Case 2: The "Evaporation" of Value, Entity Swaps, and Dilution of Early Investors
Keywords: Entity Segmentation, Dilution via Entity Swap
Another category of structural risk is even more subtle, often unfolding within ostensibly "legal" frameworks.
In 2021, amidst the market frenzy, we invested in a technology company specializing in Formal Verification. Its team consisted of experts with top-tier academic backgrounds, possessed robust technical capabilities, consistently showed respect toward investors, and maintained harmonious cooperative relations.
However, roughly two to three years later, we gradually noticed the founder began constructing an entirely new token issuance entity, aiming to advance the token project under a structure completely separate from the original investment vehicle. Even less acceptable was that this new entity neither acknowledged early equity investors nor made any attempt to incorporate them into the new token rights framework.
From a legal standpoint, their maneuver was technically flawless: the new entity was independently registered, and the original investment contract did not directly bind this new entity's actions.
Yet from a commercial logic perspective, this constituted a systematic stripping of early investors' value. Early investors used capital and trust to nurture a team and technology, only for these resources to "re-sprout" within the new entity, quietly circumventing the original equity structure.
We subsequently represented all early investors, engaging in arduous months-long negotiations with the founder. We argued firmly and insisted on securing rightful entitlements. Ultimately, we negotiated valuation terms more favorable for early investors than those offered to the new round. However, this process nearly exhausted our relational capital with the founder.
This experience profoundly taught us:
Entity swapping can be the most "elegant" method of value appropriation.
Case Conclusion
Incorporate "Entity Swap Protection Clauses" into investment agreements.
Explicitly stipulate that if the founder establishes a new affiliated entity and advances core asset (especially token) issuance within a specified post-investment period (recommended 2-3 years), early investors shall receive corresponding equity/token rights. This clause must be included from the initial investment, not added reactively after issues emerge.
Governance rights matter more than valuation.
Board seats, along with knowledge and approval rights regarding major structural changes, form the final defensive line for protecting early investors' interests. Relationship and trust alone are insufficient.
Case 3: When Human Nature Becomes a Variable, Rescue Financing, and Broken Promises
Keywords: Structural Weakening of Remediation Paths
If the previous two cases depicted cold games of law and structure, this one brims with human connections and moral complexities. Sometimes, what crushes you isn't complex clauses, but a face that shifts rapidly when faced with profit interests.
During the deepest trough of the bear market, an early portfolio project faced imminent collapse after exhausting its funds. The founder spoke earnestly, stating the balance sheet was completely drained and operations could not continue without fresh capital injection.
Motivated by a desire to protect existing investments and hold onto slim hopes for the project, we extended a helping hand, participating in a rescue financing round at a lower valuation (Down-round). The founder expressed profound gratitude at the time.
Upon fund arrival, the project survived. The market soon recovered, and the project's sector became a hotspot. Leveraging this "lifeline" capital, the founder rode the wave, coupled with exceptional storytelling prowess, eventually securing follow-on investment from renowned institutions and successfully listing on mainstream exchanges.
However, communication with the founder grew exceptionally difficult thereafter. When investors requested he honor his initial promises, he launched a series of evasions. Starting with refusing to distribute tokens to investors despite Coinbase listing requirements, then citing personal illness, family emergencies, and other excuses to delay, dragging the process out for months.
Finally, an ultimatum was issued: accept terms identical to other new investors, or walk away. Initial goodwill from the rescue funding was entirely discarded in the face of substantial financial gains.
Fortunately, our legal and post-investment teams never gave up. Through sustained, patient communication and advocacy, we ultimately recovered the vast majority of owed tokens. But this experience exposed a fundamental truth:
Shifting benefit landscapes systematically alter human behavior. This isn't cynical pessimism; it's a variable that must be proactively engineered into contract structures.
Case Conclusion
All business commitments, regardless of size, must be codified in legally binding formal documents.
Do not relax documentation standards simply because the counterparty adopts a humble posture. Business decisions should always assume worst-case scenarios. Rescue financing during bear markets often occurs when information asymmetry is highest and emotional pressure peaks—the exact moments when legal standards are most prone to erosion. The lower the counterparty's posture and the greater our negotiating leverage, the more strictly we must insist on embedding all commitments into formal agreements.
Given the scarcity of contractual spirit, guaranteeing execution requires designing "teeth-laden" clauses.
Investment agreements must explicitly define breach liabilities. For instance, failure to fulfill specific terms should trigger substantial liquidated damages, or grant investors the right to acquire additional tokens at nominal prices. The cost of default must significantly outweigh the potential gains from betrayal.
Simultaneously, ensure investors hold sufficient bargaining chips, such as board seats, veto rights over major matters, or co-control over corporate bank accounts and multi-signature wallets.
Before deciding to rescue, answer a fundamental question:
What caused the team's liquidity crisis fundamentally? Do their values withstand stress testing? Insisting on transparency and compliance stems not from distrust of founders, but from providing basic protection for the investor-founder relationship.
Case 4: Governance Absence, The Price of Silence
Keywords: Governance Reduced to Symbolism
There exists a category of risk stemming not from loopholes in legal structures or deliberate betrayals by founders, but from investors' own absence at critical junctures.
We once invested in a promising Web3 infrastructure project. Backing it was a prominent, well-capitalized major shareholder—an important factor in our bullish stance. However, during an all-hands meeting, this shareholder publicly fired the CEO, catching the entire team off guard.
We only learned of this afterward from the departing CEO, rather than through official channel communication from the project team.
Our assessment at the time: this was merely routine management adjustment, not a crisis signal warranting immediate intervention. We demanded no audit, called for no extraordinary shareholder meeting, initiated no evaluation process, and chose silence and observation.
Roughly six months to a year later, new management announced: the foundation would undergo liquidation. We ultimately recovered less than 20% of our initial investment.
Post-mortem analysis revealed that the abrupt CEO dismissal was the clearest early warning sign of the project's decline.
When companies experience significant abnormal management turnover, it often signals deep fractures in core governance structures. At that time, investors should have immediately demanded an independent audit and intervened in governance reconstruction, rather than standing by passively.
Case Conclusion
Designate major governance events as mandatory "Intervention Trigger Events."
Investment agreements must specify that significant occurrences such as abnormal CEO departure, core shareholder changes, or initiation of litigation/arbitration will automatically activate investor special rights, including demanding independent financial audits, convening extraordinary shareholder meetings, and halting major financial expenditures.
Continuous monitoring, not passive waiting.
Post-investment management should extend beyond routine quarterly updates. Investors need to establish proactive information channels, including maintaining direct communication with core project employees (not just founders). We recommend requiring project teams to provide quarterly independent updates at the CFO/CTO level in post-investment agreements, rather than relying solely on the founder as a single conduit.
Case 5: The Halo of Resumes, The Black Hole of Character
Keywords: Governance Reduced to Symbolism, Structural Weakening of Remediation Paths
The investment world often says, "Investment is investing in people." Yet, we are too easily dazzled by glittering resumes. Goldman Sachs, JPMorgan Chase, top-tier hedge funds… these names seem to carry inherent halos, leading one subconsciously to equate "elite backgrounds" with "professionalism, self-discipline, and reliability." But the harsh reality is that sometimes, the most dangerous figures are precisely these "golden boys."
Wall Street training taught them to package narratives, exploit rules, and sway hearts. These abilities are neutral in themselves, but once misapplied, their destructive power far exceeds imagination.
We were "luckily" able to pass on a project. The founder's resume was impeccable, rising to executive levels at Goldman Sachs and JPMorgan before striking out on his own. His venture aimed to build an "absolutely fair" on-chain casino. The pitch was compelling, the team illustrious, and numerous reputable firms vied to participate at the time.
However, due to severe concerns regarding regulatory compliance risks in the "casino" vertical, and after multiple unsuccessful discussions with the founder on compliance pathways, our risk control department ultimately rejected the investment.
The plot twist arrived the day after our decision. The project announced closing millions in funding. Yet, within minutes of funds landing, the founder began transferring company assets into his personal wallet. Over the following week, he gambled away millions of that sum on another on-chain entertainment app.
He promised to build a fair casino, yet used the very funds meant to build it to become a gambler in someone else's house. This wasn't risk management failure; it was blatant fraud and misappropriation. Ultimately, the FBI intervened, the founder was arrested, and faces years of imprisonment.
Another firsthand experience involved a AAA game title dubbed the "on-chain Call of Duty." Team members hailed from premier game studios, yet burn rates were terrifyingly high—at $2-3 million monthly—with development severely lagging. The company quickly plunged into financial crisis, reducing headcount from over a hundred to barely a dozen.
Just as the house of cards threatened to collapse, we discovered that the co-founder and CTO had been continuously dumping his vested team tokens on secondary markets over seven months, cashing out nearly $700,000. Legally, he sold vested shares, apparently leaving little room for fault.
Yet commercially, with the company teetering on the brink and mass layoffs occurring, a core leader frantically cashing out sends an unmistakable message: "The ship is sinking, I'm jumping first."
In both cases, investors fixated excessively on founders' historical halos while neglecting deep due diligence on their current character and behavioral patterns. Concurrently, the absence of key controls like "multi-signature requirements" and "milestone-based disbursements" directly caused loss of fund oversight.
Case Conclusion
Character Due Diligence (Character DD) must take precedence.
Resumes can be polished, narratives packaged, but character and behavioral patterns remain relatively stable. Investment firms need more systematic character DD methodologies, extending beyond standard background checks to deeper interviews, and potentially incorporating behavioral stress tests. Crucially, scrutinize whether the founder's personal history fundamentally contradicts their stated project mission.
A person with a gambling past entering the casino space is inherently a massive Red Flag.
Fund control is a non-negotiable baseline for investment.
For early-stage projects, especially where founders wield unilateral dominance, absolutely no funds should be deposited into a wallet fully controlled by a single individual. Multi-sig wallets must be mandated, with the investor or their designated trusted third party required as a signatory.
Fund disbursement should be tied to clear, quantifiable milestones: release each tranche only upon task completion. These mature risk control mechanisms in traditional VC must be rigorously enforced in crypto.
Deeply align the core team's interests with the project's long-term development.
Token unlocking for the team should tie not only to time, but critically to project milestones, such as product launch, user base reaching certain thresholds, or protocol revenue hitting specific levels. Additionally, agreements must explicitly restrict core member token sales during financial distress or major crises.
This serves both as a constraint and a statement of commitment, signaling to the community and all investors that the team stands or falls with the project.
Conclusion: Returning to Common Sense, Navigating Cycles
Having endured so much, we are no longer the fervent "Web3 believers" of old. We have evolved into realists, risk assessors, observers of human nature. We no longer get excited by grand narratives; instead, we scrutinize every detail like auditors and test every assumption like engineers.
When evaluating a project, we now continually ask ourselves:
Do we truly know this founder? Beyond the story he tells, have we sought insight into his character from sideways angles—former colleagues, ex-bosses, even competitors?
Have we genuinely deciphered this project's legal architecture? Are there hidden "backdoors"? If the founder absconds, is the contract in our hands mere scrap paper or a sharp sword?
Post-funding, do we retain control over capital utilization, or do we merely hope in the founder's moral restraint?
Are the founding team's interests and ours perfectly aligned? Does their token unlock mechanism encourage long-term cultivation or facilitate short-term cash-outs?
When early warning signs emerge, do we have the courage to say no?
Ultimately, sound investment structures aren't designed to guard against gentlemen, but against extreme scenarios. When everyone acts decently, any architecture functions smoothly; the true test lies in whether your contracts can speak for you during periods of divergent interests, market turmoil, and collapsed trust.
We paid for these lessons in hard cash. We document them because we believe,
the cost of industry progress should not be repeatedly borne by every new wave of entrants.
Accordingly, we have systematically integrated continuous compliance monitoring, entity swap protection clauses, and mandatory multi-sig wallet requirements into our investment workflows. These are not superficial paper exercises, but institutional upgrades forged through repeated real-world costs.
This piece marks the inaugural submission of the IOSG-Legal series. We will continue releasing industry practice guidelines; peers are welcome to exchange insights and co-develop standards. If you possess similar practical experience, structural insights, or cautionary tales to share, submissions and dialogues are warmly invited.
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