Meet SHRINCS: Bitcoin's Emerging Frontrunner for a Post-Quantum Signature

Головні тези
- Blockstream Research Director Jonas Nick and researcher Mikhail Kudinov published a security analysis of SHRINCS, an emerging frontrunner for a post-quantum signature scheme in Bitcoin.
- SHRINCS leans on Bitcoin’s battle-tested SHA-256, but combines a compact, efficient “stateful” path.
- Nick warns wallets must automatically enforce the stateless fallback to prevent catastrophic user error, though heavy stateless use could bloat the chain and raise fees.
Blockstream Research Director Jonas Nick, with Mikhail Kudinov and collaborators, published a security analysis on Thursday for SHRINCS, advancing an emerging frontrunner for a post-quantum signature scheme in Bitcoin.
“We need all the possible feedback—engineers, cryptographers, protocol developers,” Kudinov, a post-quantum cryptography researcher at Blockstream, said in reference to a draft of SHRINCS’ Bitcoin Improvement Proposal (BIP). “There are a lot of things to check, test, complain about, or praise."
Notably, SHRINCS is a hash-based signature scheme that leverages SHA-256 to anchor its security in battle-tested primitives that are already used by Bitcoin, representing a conservative effort to minimize the proposal’s trust assumptions.
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That said, the scheme comes with trade-offs, most notably by introducing potential security vulnerabilities at the implementation level if misused. The scheme combines two spending paths: a small, more efficient stateful signature option and a larger, more costly stateless path with fewer security risks on the implementation side.
Although stateful signatures are compact, preserving Bitcoin’s ability to process transactions efficiently, a user can trigger a critical failure—where an attacker can forge a signature for that address and steal funds if a one-time state is accidentally reused. Because SHRINCS’ stateful path relies on one-time keys that can only safely sign a single transaction, wallet developers must carefully track each key’s state.
Navigating human error
“It needs to be impossible for the user to behave in a way that this catastrophic event happens,” Nick told Head of MARA Foundation Isabel Foxen Duke during a recent appearance on MARA Foundation TV. “Wallet developers need to deal with this stateful component correctly.”
According to Nick, for SHRINCS to work safely in the real world, its specification and corresponding wallet implementations must automatically enforce the stateless path fallback in any situation where a state counter could possibly be compromised.
While some users might gravitate toward stateless signatures out of caution, Nick warns that widespread adoption could bloat the blockchain and drive up fees across the network.
Bitcoin’s current ECDSA signatures are typically 71 bytes long (and Taproot Schnorr signatures are 64 bytes). Under SHRINCS, stateful signatures are anywhere from 548 to 4,619 bytes, while stateless ones are 5,777 bytes. That said, optimizations of both signature paths have been accelerating with the support of AI-based research, Nick noted.
“We don’t know what the fee market will look like once we have these very big signatures,” he said. “And it’s not just the fee market, it’s also just fewer transactions fit into a block, meaning fewer people can use Bitcoin. And I think this changes the value proposition of Bitcoin.”
As the SHRINCS working group—which includes researchers backed by nonprofits including Brink and OpenSats—continues to refine the proposal’s specification, Blockstream researchers stress that getting the cryptographic foundation right is only half the battle.
Whether the broader Bitcoin ecosystem is ready to embrace SHRINCS’ inherent trade-offs will depend heavily on feedback from the network’s stakeholders in the months ahead. Meanwhile, Nick and Kudinov are requesting review of the proposal and the security analysis.
André Beganski is a Senior Content Manager at MARA Foundation, producing content on topics including the intersection of quantum computing and cryptography. He has previously worked for Decrypt.




