Bitcoin Quantum Defense Could ‘Change the Value Proposition’ of BTC: Researcher

Researchers behind SHRINCS have released a detailed security analysis of the proposed Bitcoin post-quantum signature scheme, bringing it closer to practical consideration while highlighting unresolved concerns about wallet safety, transaction costs, and implementation complexity.
Huvudpunkter
- SHRINCS researchers released a security analysis of the proposed Bitcoin post-quantum signature scheme, establishing formal security arguments while acknowledging unresolved assumptions and the need for independent auditing.
- SHRINCS combines smaller stateful signatures with a larger stateless fallback, seeking to minimize transaction fees and blockchain congestion. However, improper reuse of one-time signing keys could expose users to catastrophic theft risks.
- Bitcoin’s growing quantum computing concerns are driving research into new cryptographic protections, but SHRINCS faces criticism over wallet security, implementation complexity, and transaction costs.
Bitcoin researchers have published a comprehensive security analysis of SHRINCS, an emerging post-quantum cryptography proposal designed to protect the network against future quantum computing attacks without sacrificing as much transaction capacity as competing solutions.
The 131-page analysis, dated Nov. 18, was authored by Blockstream researcher Mikhail Kudinov, with contributions from research director Jonas Nick and other collaborators. It provides a formal security argument for the proposed signature scheme, addressing a major outstanding requirement for the experimental technology.
The researchers evaluated SHRINCS against classical and quantum adversaries, reporting security bounds of approximately 121.4 to 122.7 bits against classical attacks under their analytical framework. The study also develops quantum security bounds, although some results depend on conjectures that remain unproven.
The document explicitly cautions that the proposal has not undergone an independent security audit and is not ready for deployment.
“We need all the possible feedback—engineers, cryptographers, protocol developers,” Kudinov said, referring to the draft Bitcoin Improvement Proposal (BIP), first announced in August. “There are a lot of things to check, test, complain about, or praise.”
Smaller Signatures Come With Security Trade-Offs
SHRINCS, short for Shrunken SPHINCS, uses SHA-256, the established cryptographic hash function already integral to Bitcoin, rather than introducing the different mathematical assumptions underpinning some alternative post-quantum schemes.
The design combines two signature methods under a single public key. Its primary, stateful mechanism produces signatures ranging from 548 to 4,619 bytes, while a stateless fallback generates signatures of 5,777 bytes.
Both are substantially larger than Bitcoin’s existing 64-byte Schnorr signatures, but the more efficient stateful option could help limit the blockchain congestion and higher transaction fees associated with a transition to quantum-resistant cryptography.
However, stateful signatures introduce a potentially catastrophic weakness if wallet software improperly reuses a one-time signing key for different transactions. Such a mistake could allow an attacker to forge signatures and steal funds.
“It needs to be impossible for the user to behave in a way that this catastrophic event happens,” Nick told MARA Foundation Head Isabel Foxen Duke during a video interview published Thursday. “Wallet developers need to deal with this stateful component correctly.”
SHRINCS attempts to mitigate that danger by requiring wallets to permanently record each signing operation before producing a signature. If the signing state becomes unreliable, including when a wallet is restored from a seed phrase, then the software must switch to the larger stateless signatures.
The approach protects against unsafe key reuse, but could increase transaction costs for users recovering wallets or operating multiple devices.
“We don’t know what the fee market will look like once we have these very big signatures,” Nick said. “And it’s not just the fee market, it’s also just fewer transactions fit into a block, meaning fewer people can use Bitcoin. And I think this changes the value proposition of Bitcoin.”
The design has already attracted criticism. In an August review, researchers at Project Eleven argued that prioritizing blockchain efficiency could transfer unacceptable security risks to wallet users. They suggested considering a purely stateless alternative alongside changes to Bitcoin’s block capacity.
Ledger Chief Technology Officer Charles Guillemet has also raised concerns about wallet compatibility, hardware performance, and the difficulty of reproducing existing Bitcoin features, including certain multisignature arrangements and public-key derivation methods.
Bitcoin’s Quantum Countdown
The research arrives amid mounting attention to the potential threat that sufficiently powerful quantum computers pose to Bitcoin’s elliptic-curve cryptography.
As Bitcoin.com News reported in October, Google researchers demonstrated a quantum computing technique called magic state cultivation that reduced certain errors by a factor of 40, marking progress toward more reliable quantum computation.
Earlier Google research estimated that approximately 6.9 million BTC could potentially be exposed to future quantum attacks because their associated public keys have already been revealed. No existing quantum computer has demonstrated the ability to break Bitcoin’s cryptography, though researchers warn it could happen in a matter of years.
Meanwhile, Bitcoin developers are debating how to transition existing holdings to quantum-resistant addresses.
One particularly contentious proposal, BIP-361, would eventually prevent spending from vulnerable legacy addresses that fail to migrate within a proposed multiyear transition period. Critics warn that such an approach could permanently strand coins belonging to inactive holders.
SHRINCS addresses a different part of the problem: providing a practical cryptographic method for authorizing transactions once Bitcoin supports quantum-resistant signatures. Its adoption would still require additional protocol changes, extensive testing, and broader developer consensus.
The new security analysis represents progress toward that goal, but its authors acknowledge that several mathematical assumptions remain unresolved. Additional peer review, implementation testing, and consideration of real-world wallet behavior will be necessary before the scheme can be considered suitable for Bitcoin.
For now, the research underscores the central challenge facing Bitcoin’s post-quantum transition: protecting users against a future cryptographic threat without introducing dangerous new vulnerabilities or undermining the network’s ability to process transactions.




